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"Good science advice is essential to wise decision-making."
-- John Kerry

Abstract: In 2001, President George W. Bush remarked, "Science and technology havc
never been more essential to the defense of the nation and the health of the econ~my."'
The responsibility for formulating science and technology policy primarily falls into the
hands of Congress. However, since few members of Congress possess a broad base of
knowledge in either science or technology, they must rely on external sources of
information. I examine the sources of information on which they rely, or the question
"Who has the Congressional Ear?"with regard to science and technology issues. Using
the downfall of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1995 as a point of
punctuated equilibrium, according to Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones' theoretical
framework for ~oliticalchange.
- , I examine the issues of NASA authorizations. hazardous
waste (superfund), and global warming, before and after OTA, looking at the sources of
information in congressional hearings on these particular issues. I found that the degree
of politicization v a e d , depending on the issuein question. The politicization was greatest in the issue of global warming. Overall, there was a decrease in the number of
witnesses per issue and an increase in the number of witnesses with a Republican
affiliation.

'

Remarks by President George W. Bush in Meeting with High-Tech Leaders. March 28,2001. Available
Taken from National Academy of
at htto://www.whitehouse.ogv/news/releases/2001/03/20010328-2h~.
Sciences, "Rising Above the Gathering Stom", Prepublication copy February 2006, p. ES-12.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Who has the congressional ear? The answer to this question has profound
implications public policy, particularly given the complexity and pervasive applications
of scientific and technological discoveries. In 1998, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., the
chairman of the House Committee on Science, noted:
"Science and engineering provide more than the ideas for future products
or the foundation for advances in manufacturing. They also provide the
basis for making decisions as a society, as corporations and as
individuals.. . For example, we turn to scientists and engineers for answers
to questions such as "To what standards should cities' building codes be
written?" Engineers, seismologists, geologists and materials scientists may
all need to be consulted. Or, "Is the food on the dinner table safe to eat?"
"Is a new drug ready for use by humans?" Epidemiologists,
microbiologists and pharmacologists, among many others, must inform us
(Sensenbrenner, 1998,47)."
Global warming, nuclear weapons, anti-terrorism mechanisms, nano-technology,
space exploration, and superconductivityare only a few of the many issues which
demand scientific expertise. Congress also must make decisions related to
medicine and health care, electronics, energy, and technology funding. The 2006
National Academies of Science (NAS) report "Rising Above the Gathering
Storm" (RAGS) reminds us that the products of science and technology have
made notable improvements in our daily lives over the past century: vaccines and
drugs, which now prevent the outbreaks of smallpox, tuberculosis, typhoid, or
cholera, lifesaving medical instrumentation, electronic communications devices,
and work-saving conveniences in our homes, including electricity, sanitation, and
transportation (NAS, 2006, 2: 1) . Further, RAGS points out that the "largest

economic influence is in the productivity gains that follow the adoption of new
products and technologies (NAS, 2006,2:
If science and technology (S&T) play such an important role in the health
and wellbeing of our nation, then Congress must base its policies on sound
scientific advice. The House Committee on Science (formerly the Science, Space
and Technology Committee) is primarily responsible for deliberating over most
science issues. The Committee's official jurisdiction gives it responsibility "over
all non-defense federal scientific research and development (R&D)" and charges
it to ensure "that Federal tax dollars are being spent wisely and efficiently and that
America's Federal science and technology enterprise maintains its world
preeminence." Additionally, the Committee is responsible for proposing ways in
which research and development can solve some of our nation's most pressing
problems.4

Dr. Albert Teich of the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) noted (Teich, 2006, I), "Few Members of Congress, with the notable exception
of several members of this [House Science] committee, and relatively few congressional
staff, have backgrounds in science." While Congress must make many decisions with
regard to science and technology, most Congress members do not possess a broad base of
knowledge in these subject areas. As a result, they have to depend on outside sources of

D.J. Wilson. Is embodied technology change the result of upstream R&D? Industry-level evidence
Review of Economic Dynamics 5(2)(2002):342-362.
Taken from the House Committee on Science website. Official Jurisdiction of the Committee. Last
accessed 16 December 2006, httD:llwww.house.eov/scienceicommitteeinfomembe/inde.h.
bid
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scientific information. The House Committee on Science Report, "Unlocking our Future:
Toward a New National Science Policy" notes,
"While every individual must exercise his or her own judgment in making
decisions -and be willing to accept responsibility for doing s e w e
nevertheless must of necessity rely on decisions made by our elected
officials, regulators, and the courts for decisions that affect our society.
When the decisions to be made involve technical issues, decision-makers
must have access to and, to a large extent rely on, the advice and counsel
of the scientific and engineering community (Sensenbrenner, 1998,47)."
Science committee chair F. James Sensenbrenner (Sensenbrenner, 1998,48) notes, "To
further complicate matters, in many cases science simply does not have all of the
answers" and sometimes "different scientists may derive very different inferences &om
the available data." Thus, scientific advice becomes complicated because,
"Those on both sides of the issue level charges that the other side is doing
"bad" science. Each side produces its own contingent of scientists who in
turn put forth conflicting interpretations of the available data, if they even
agree on that. Accusations are made that the other side's scientists "have
an agenda" or are beholden to a particular stakeholder in the issue
(Sensenbrenner, 1998,48)."
The notion of "bad science" recently has become contentious across partisan
lines, with the 1994 Republican takeover of majority in Congress and the subsequent
changes to the congressional scientific advisory process. Chris Mooney, author o f m
Republican War on Science, states that the current Republican approach to science is
only slightly less tainted than that of Stalinist ~ ~ s e n k o i s(Mooney,
m~
2005, 12). He
argues that under Republican leadership, science and scientific fact have become
increasingly used as weapons of Congress to support or validate political agendas.

Lysenkoism was a campaign against genetics and geneticists which happened in the Soviet Union from
the middle of the 1930s to the middle of the 1960s, centered on the figure of TrofirnDenisovich Lysenko.
Lysenkoism is oftcn invoked to imply the overt subversion of science by political forces.

Mooney contends, ''Inrecent years, the Republicans as a party have been alienating
intellectuals deliberately, as a matter of taste and strategy (2005, 165)." He argues that
current "abuses push the issue of science politicization to the point of crisis" (2005,242)
in which the impacts of politicized science start to have real implications for society.
Sensenbrenner highlights environmental concerns as one particular example of the
implications of science policy stating, "Properly managing our natural resources,
ensuring clean air and clean water for every citizen, and preserving the planet for future
generations are concerns shared by every American. The decisions that must be made in
order to tackle these issues, however, are at times highly contentious (Mooney, 2006,

Professor Jon Peha from Carnegie Mellon University (Peha, 2006) noted, "With
this kind of issue, Congress needs balanced analysis that identifies possible policy
options, and pros and cons of each, without telling Congress what to do. Armed with this
basic knowledge, Members of Congress can listen to stakeholders, and make their own
decisions about which policy is best overall. But who can provide this background?" Dr.
Peter Blair, of the National Research Committee remarks similarly, pointing out that

"James Madison or Thomas Jefferson might well have argued that a
government poorly informed about science and technology issues, because
such issues are often so complex and have such impact on society, is
destined to make bad policy choices. Yet, today, it is becoming
increasingly more difficult for anyone, or even any institution, to keep
pace with the frontier of knowledge. How, then, can the Congress receive
usefbl, relevant, informed, independent, authoritative and timely advice on
the science and technology dimensions of the issues it faces?" (2006, 1)
Until the Republicans won a House majority in the 1994 congressional elections,
one answer to Peha's question was the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).

The OTA was created in 1972 to provide an unbiased source of scientific
information for Congress. While the OTA was largely successful in that endeavor, it was
eliminated in 1994, in what Bruce Bimber (1996, 69) calls a partisan assertion of
authority. When the OTA fell, Congress lost its primary source of non-partisan
information. According to Mooney (2006,48) "getting rid of an impartial scientific
source like OTA greatly facilitated the politicization of science." Dr. Peter Blair of the
National Research Council elaborates on the effects of the loss of the OTA:
"With the closure of the former Office of Technology Assessment (OTA),
the latter type of analysis [elaborate on the broader context of an issue and
inform the policy debate with careful and objective analysis of the policy
consequences of alternative courses of action, especially those that may
involve value judgments and trade-offs beyond the scope of technical
analysis] as performed by a disinterested analytical organization is no
longer readily accessible to the Congress and may need to be
reconstructed in some way (Blair, 2006,4)."
Yet neither the Republican attack on science, nor the claim that the fall of the
OTA has removed objectivity from congressional deliberation on science has been
subjected to a systematic analysis. Bruce Bimber's study of the OTA demise does not
compare the sources of information during the existence of the OTA and after the fall of
the OTA. Meanwhile Mooney relies on selective examples rather than systematic
analysis to support his argument. This study fills the gap between the Mooney and
Bimber studies by analyzing the sources of information to the House Committee on
Science before and after the fall of the OTA. This study addresses three questions. First,
did the GOP takeover of the House and the subsequent demise of the OTA increase the
degree of unscientific or politically biased sources of information provided to Congress?
Second, did Congress lose the type of objective and unbiased information provided by the

OTA, or did some other institution serve the function previously performed by OTA?
Third, did the sources of scientific information take on a distinctly Republican bent after
the decline of OTA? In order to address these questions, I begin with a brief description
of the OTA's history and purpose. Then I develop specific hypotheses based on a theory
of punctuated equilibrium derived fiom Baumgartner and Jones (1 993) study of agenda
change.
The Rise and Fall of the OTA
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was created by the Technology
Assessment Act of 1972 for the express purpose "to improve foresight about the
consequences of policy decisions involving scientific or technological questions (Birnber,
1996,26)." It was one of four institutions with the responsibility of giving Congress
impartial and unbiased advice on science and technology. The others are the Government
Accountability Office (formerly the General Accounting Office) (GAO), the Ofice of
Budget Management (OBM), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). These four
agencies collectively became the manifestation of the idea of "experts who were on tap,
not on top (Bimber, 1996,28)." In other words, these agencies comprised a group of
experts who were "on-call" to Congress at any time.
The OTA and other scientific advisory agencies attempted to bridge the natural
divide between policy-makers and scientists. John Gibbons, former director of the Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA) and former Science Advisor to President Clinton,
observes (Golden, 1995,415) that "practitioners of science and technology on the one
hand, and law on the other remain largely ignorant of the other's mysteries-the
scientist's reaction to the intricacies of policy-making parallels the politician's aversion

to the laboratories, to the uncertainties inherent in research and, sometimes, to the
constraints on decision-making that are the outcome of analysis." Dr. Alan Mazur,
professor of Public Affairs at Syracuse University argues (Mazur, 1981,82) that even
"The political judgments of scientists are shaped by their social milieus, just as are those
of laymen, and in this value-laden domain, the scientist has no greater claim to wisdom or
objectivity than anyone else." The OTA was designed to overcome these divides, by
providing an unbiased source of scientific information. Dr. Peter Blair points out that
"Indeed, OTA was prohibited in its enabling legislation from making
recommendations, so the panel was created to try to collect the views of
all important stakeho1der;rather than to try to
consensus
recommendations (although consensus findings and conclusions were
provided and viewed as important by requesting Congressional
committees). Instead, the OTA project teams sought to analyze and
articulate the consequences of alternative courses of action and elaborate
on the context of a problem without coming to consensus
recommendations on a specific course of action, which would be difficult
anyway with a diverse group with points of view that prevented consensus
on many controversial issues (2006, I)."
Congress needs sources of scientific information of this kind, consisting of neutral
experts (Bimber, 1996, 16) who are "more concerned with the substance of policy
problems than with the impact of policy choices." Dr. Jeffrey Stine, the curator of
Engineering and Environmental History at the National Museum of American History,
crystallizes this argument: "To fulfill its funding and oversight roles properly, Congress
must have its own bipartisan science and technology advisory apparatus, free of agency
or disciplinary bias" (Golden, 1995,446). The OTA filled this role for Congress during
its time of existence.

The OTA was a small organization which maintained a simple command structure
composed of two levels: analysts and the heads of the agency (Bimber, 1996,30),

roughly 75 percent of whom were researchers by profession (Bimber, 1996,31). While
the majority of the staff had research backgrounds, OTA officials did not conduct any
assessment themselves; analysts merely acted as brokers for information generated by
scientists working outside of the government (Bimber, 1996,28). The agency was
overseen by a board of directors known as the Technology Assessment Board (TAB)
which was designed to be completely non-partisan. The TAB board of directors
determined which studies the OTA would complete, reviewed the studies which were
performed by the OTA, and maneuvered between the congressional committees in order
to serve all parties equally and foster a personal clientele. OTA's information was most
successfully utilized when it could be passed directly to members of Congress and
staffers, through means of a person-to-person connection. Bimber (1996, 35) says "This
tension, between the need for personal familiarity and for institutional neutrality and
credibility was one of the most defining features of OTA as an organization." Further,
only congressional committee chairs could request the creation of an OTA report, which
significantly limited the size of the OTA ~lientele.~

Although the OTA was praised for its neutrality, the process of achieving
neutrality was certainly not a pre-condition of the agency. Rather, the OTA was unique
in that, contrary to most agencies which begin with a neutral basis and progress to higher
degrees of politicization in order to survive, it actually began with a high degree of
politicization and gradually became more neutral (Bimber, 1996, 21). In its early years,
under "Rule Number 12", which gave the control of the agency staff appointments

While the combination of these two factors, focused clientele and personal cornmumcation with Congress,
led to praise for the OTA's effectiveness and efficiency, (Bimber, 1996, p.31) it was also one of the reasons
for its downfall in 1995.
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entirely over to board members, OTA found itself suffering from political appointments
and strong politicization (Bimber, 1996, 54). The "key to OTA's changed stature was its
need to build and maintain for itself an internal clientele" (Bimber, 1996, 51), which was
originally attempted through partisan favoritism under Director Daddario, and then
successfully achieved through balanced neutrality under Peterson and Gibbons. Indeed
Bimber classifies the cornerstone of OTA's success as its "ability to separate institutional
loyalty from partisanship loyalty" (Bimber, 1996,49). Further, he states that Gibbon's
reforms and "Fourth of July Massacre," (Bimber, 1996, 57) in which Gibbons fired 15%
of his staff and began a strategy of neutrality saved the agency from extinction in the
1980's. Neutrality became one of OTA's defining features, as well as a defining
characteristic for the other scientific advisors to Congress. The OTA found that the
strategy of not making policy recommendations and instead offering "something for
everyone" generated the least conflict and criticism (Bimber, 1996,64). These
characteristics were the OTA's strength, causing it to become a model for a neutral
scientific advisory agency, duplicated around the world, notably in Germany, the UK,
France, and the Netherlands (Bimber, 1996,47).
The OTA's operations, and productivity were smaller than the other government
research agencies, and its impact on policy makers was hard to quantify. In terms of
productivity, the OTA annually published an average of 20 to 30 studies per year, at a
cost of approximately $1 million per study (Bimber, 1996,33). By comparison, the CRS
receives nearly % million requests for studies per year (Bimber, 1996, 80); meanwhile the
budget of the GAO is five times that of the CBO and the CRS combined (Bimber, 1996,

88). The GAO publishes approximately 2,000 studies each year7. Further, Bimber states
that one cannot cite a single bill in which OTA clearly decided the outcome (1996,36).
Rather, OTA's influence was primarily rhetorical and analytical. Furthermore (Bimber,
1996, 36), "OTA's work played a role more consistent with rational models of politics in
which the utility of information derives from its capacity to reduce uncertainty." Bimber
states that to see the real effects of the agency, one has to look back to when policy
proposals were formulated, because (1996,39) "once positions are determined, it's too
late [for the experts to matter]." The OTA did not instruct the legislators how to vote, but
rather that it helped them establish a basis for their positions (Bimber, 1996,46).
Bimber then poses the question, if the OTA was so effective, why was it cut as a
part of the congressional downsizing agenda of the 1994 elections? Observers offer two
answers to this question: one institutional, the other political. First, the customary GOP
answer is that the OTA was expendable; it was small, performed a specialized function,
and would have few short term consequences if it was cut. Representative George E.
Brown, Jr. reflected this view: he said, "OTA was a small, easily targeted agency whose
elimination would have an adverse affect on Congress' long-term well-being, but would
not have any direct, short term consequences for legislators' interest (Bimber, 1996, 72)."
The monetary effect of cutting the OTA was minuscule; the federal government saved
approximately $20 million dollars in culting OTA (Bimber, 1996,71). While it
performed a unique service, Bimber concluded (77), "funding for OTA was abolished not
because it was so large, but because it was so tiny." Further, while few members of
Congress disputed the comprehensiveness of the OTA reports, many were dissatisfied

with the length of time that it took for the OTA to produce a single report, arguing that it
was ineffective because of the timeframe on which it operated.
The second answer is that the OTA was cut because the new Republican majority
had its own scientific agenda, and the OTA did not fit that agenda. Mooney (2005,54)
compares the OTA to Socrates, saying "He gave advice to other people. He was
poisoned." While Newt Gingrich Republicans promoted the abolition of the OTA as a
'free market' concept, Mooney points out that it resulted in a 'fiee market' of science
expertise, where authority went to the highest bidder or the greatest power (2005, 50).
Thus, Representative Brown likewise recognized the political cause of the OTA's
demise: "Let me conclude with an observation made by a former OTA employee who
stated OTA's task as being to create for Congress a 'defense against the dumb.' It is
shameful that OTA was defenseless against a very dumb decision by Congress. In the
end, OTA proved to be too smart for a new Congress that is in love with simple answers
(1995, I)." While OTA did have powerful friends in Congress, who prevented its demise
briefly through controversial amendments, ultimately, they were not able to prevent its
downfall.
The OTA fulfilled an important role in the scientific policy-making process. Not
only was held in high regard by the majority of the legislative community for the quality
of work that it put forth, but it provided a type of information and analysis which Dr.
Blair asserts is no longer readily available to Congress. As Dr. Blair (2006,4) noted,
without the OTA, there is a gap in the type of information and analysis that Congress
receives: "With the closure of the former Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the
latter type of analysis ... is no longer readily accessible to the Congress." Now, without

the presence of the OTA, presumably Congress members depend more heavily on their
own scientific experts, who most likely possess a stake in the policy outcome. Blair's
statement leads us nicely into the overarching question of this study: To what extent did
the demise of the OTA change the information that Congress receives?

Punctuated Equilibrium
How can the disappearance of a research organization that serves Congress alter
the sources of information received by it congressional committees? In Agendas and
Instability in American Politics, Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones propose a theory of
punctuated equilibrium in political dynamics, much like that of Nils Eldridge and Steven
J. Gould (Eldridge, 1972) in evolutionary biology. In essence, their argument is that
agenda change happens suddenly even in the most stable institutions. Stability is defined
by a state of equilibrium in a subsystem institution, such as a congressional committee, in
which "essential features would not change significantly" (Baumgartner and Jones, 1996,
13). A state of equilibrium can be disrupted, or punctuated, by political or institutional
forces, and ultimately a new state of equilibrium will emerge over time. Change occurs
in select "windows of opportunity," in which all the necessary preconditions align.
These windows of opportunity are produced with issue redefinition and institutional
change. Issue redefinition can occur when popular opinion shifts, or when a powerful
enough institutional agenda re-aligns. Likewise, institutional change can be structural, or
political.
The theory of punctuated equilibrium suggests that the sources of information
utilized by Congress should shift, after the demise of the OTA. Though he did not use
the terminology defined by Baumgartner and Jones, Mooney essentially argues that the

GOP takeover of the House and the demise of the OTA constitute a point of punctuated
equilibrium with respect to science policy. Presumably, a less politicized and stable
system of science policy formation was dismantled and replaced by a more politicized
system with a Republican bias. Mooney suggests that, in the absence of the OTA,
Republicans began relying more heavily on their own scientists for information, fostering
both the idea that "truth is more likely to be found at the fringes of science than at the
center" (2005,55) and that one could "pick up the phone and call your bud" (2005,249)
for scientific information. If such an abrupt and pervasive shock took effect in 1995, then
the House Committee on Science, the predominant subsystem of science policy making
in Congress, would receive information from very different sources. Moreover, since
Mooney claims that the Republican war on science stretches across various types of
issues, from chemicals in the water to greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, presumably
the change would not discriminate by issue. Bimber predicts a similar result, suggesting
that the absence of a decentralized, expert advice agency leads to an eventual reliance on
Congress members' own favored scientists, consequently yielding greater politicization
of scientific information (1996, 99).
In order to test these claims, therefore, we must consider the sources of

information given to the House Committee on Science across a range of issues before and
after the fall of the OTA. This study selects three areas of science policy (NASA
authorization, superfund, and global warming) for reasons that are described in the
following chapter. For now, let it suffice to clarify three hypotheses which I test by
analyzing patterns in witness appearances in testimonies for hearings of the House
Committee on Science for each of these three issues.

The first hypothesis, i.e. the "politicization hypothesis," is that more witnesses
that represent organizations with a bias testify to the House Committee on Science after
.the decline of the OTA. Politicization, as it relates to science, generally occurs when
industry groups, interest groups, or partisan government officials lay specific pressure on
Congress in favor of a particular policy or policy action. We can measure politicization
quantitatively in this study by comparing the presence of different witness types, before
and after 1995. An increase in the number of interest group witnesses and industry
witnesses would suggest an increased level of politicization. The second hypothesis, the
"substitute hypothesis," predicts that the objective information provided by OTA is not
substituted for by some other government research organization, like OTA. A
politicized Congress that just eliminated OTA presumably would have no interest in
replacing its advice with information from a similar institution. The third hypothesis, "the
party hypothesis," predicts that witnesses testifying after the OTA's demise have a
Republican bias. Thus, not only are witnesses more biased, but they present information
favorable to Republican viewpoints on all issues. It is possible that the results of all three
of these hypotheses could depend on the issues in question and the degree of partisan
divide inherent within the issue itself. In other words, issues are privy to partisan divide
are more likely to see increased politicization after the fall of the OTA. For this reason,
the issues which I select are particularly beneficial, because they fall along a continuum
of inherent political divide, which is clarified in chapter two.
A fair test of each hypothesis requires a clearly defined methodology for selecting
cases, defining concepts, and variables and gathering data, steps that are take in Chapter
two. In Chapter three, I test all three hypotheses for all three issues. The final chapter

draws several conclusions fiom the analysis. The ultimate aim of the thesis, again, is to
evaluate the claim that the demise of OTA fundamentally altered sources of scientific
information in Congress. Thus, the issue of politicization is really at the heart of this
study, and the stakes are high. John Gibbons, the former director of the OTA and the
Science Advisor to former President Clinton stated, "Healthy skepticism is an essential
and treasured feature of scientific analysis, but the willful distortion of evidence has no
place at the table of scientific enquiry" (Mooney, 2005,59). Inaccurate or politicized
science often leads to misinformed or ill-advised decisions. Chris Mooney (2005, 11)
echoes this sentiment: "Science politicization threatens not just our public health and the
environment, but the very integrity of American democracy, which relies heavily on
scientific and technical expertise to function."

CHAPTER 11: OTA AND CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

This chapter lays the essential groundwork for a close analysis of politicization on
the House Committee on Science after the demise of the OTA. I begin with a
comprehensive review of the OTA's input into congressional committee deliberations,
including witness testimony from OTA officials and OTA reports. The data illustrate
OTA's broad presence on Capitol Hill from its origins in 1972 to its demise in 1995.
The OTA studied so many different issues and testified before so many different
committees that a comprehensive analysis of the OTA's input into congressional
deliberations is virtually impossible. Thus, my study focuses on a few issues handled by
one major committee. The House Committee on Science is the primary deliberative
body to receive OTA's expertise, though the frequency of OTA's advice to the committee
varied by policy issue. After applying several criteria for selecting case studies for
analyzing the effect of OTA as a source of science information, I explain why I chose
NASA authorization, Superfund, and global warming for further analysis. Each issue
received the attention of the committee both before and after the OTA was abolished and
taken together the three issues provide a reasonably good blend of topics to study the
extent to which the GOP politicized science after OTA disappeared from the scene.
Overview of the OTA Activity

On the verge of its abolition fiom Congress, OTA's proponents praised the
agencies contributions to congressional deliberation. Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA)
stated,
"Since its inception in 1972, OTA has served as the scientific arm of
Congress. In the effort to spend the dollars more wisely, it seems to me
that OTA is more critical today than ever before. OTA helps Congress
determine what projects should be undertaken, streamlined and made more

effective. It is often said that knowledge is power. Having the right
information, the right knowledge, will allow us to better be able to make
the right decisions. In this case, OTA provides us with the knowledge,
gives us the'power (Kennedy, 1995, I)."
Representative Connie Morella (R-MD) stated,
"OTA's reports have led to important cost-saving innovations for our
agencies as well. OTA's continued existence is critical to our resolution of
complicated policy questions through an objective analysis of difficult
issues (Morella, 1995, I)."
From 1972 to 1995, the OTA published 721 reports on a wide variety of subjects,
and OTA officials appeared as witnesses in congressional hearings 639 times. The
OTA's participation in congressional deliberations increased over its 20 year life-span
(see Figure 1). As was mentioned in Chapter I, the year 1980 represented a critical
turning point for the OTA, after which the agency became a more frequent presence on
Capitol Hill. The 1980 transformation in the OTA's congressional role correlates with
some of the upheavals and changes which OTA director John H. Gibbons made to save
the agency from downfall. During that same year, the OTA provided significant scientific
advice to Congress on controversial issues such as the 1980 Energy Security Act, the
Clean Air Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund), and the Foreign Assistance Act
(Houghton, 1995). In hearing before the House Committee on Science on July 25,2006,
Representative Rush Holt (D-NJ) commented,
"Although the OTA had its detractors, the OTA was a part of the
Legislative Branch of the U.S. Government and existed to serve the
Congress in one manner: scientific and technical advice for Congress. The
OTA was able to elaborate on the broader context of an issue and inform
the policy debate with assiduous and objective analysis of the policy
consequences of alternative courses of action (Holt, 2006, I)."
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Figure 1: OTA Activity (Witness Appearances and Published Reports), 1972 to 1996

I

OTA Activity, 1970 to 1996

Appearances
Re~orts

1970

1980

1990

2000

Year

** Data labels are above the points which they reference
The data reveal a relationship between the number of OTA reports and the
number of the OTA witness appearances before 1994. The average number of OTA
witness appearances per year is approximately 26, with a standard deviation of
approximately 15. Based on this analysis, we begin to see the decline in the OTA
appearances in 1994, with the relationship ending in 1995 when the OTA makes more
reports to Congress than ever before, but the number of hearings drops to the lowest
levels since the late 1970s. By 1996 the OTA disappears as a source of information to
Congress. The reports published by the OTA in 1995 most likely were requested during
the 103'~Congress, as reports generally were published within one to two years of
request. The decline of OTA witnesses before the House committee on Science is not
surprising, since Robert Walker (R-PA) replaced George E. Brown (D-CA) as Chair after
the GOP took control of the House in 1995. A long standing OTA advocate, Brown was

an industrial physicist, and was remembered upon his death as not only "a strong
advocate for federal R&D, he was also someone who attempted to look beyond the
conventional wisdom and challenge traditional thinking about science and technology
and their role in society (NPACI, 1999, I)." Walker, an educator and Political Scientist
by degree, had a negative view of the OTA, stating in 2001, "Its [OTA's] client was
Congress, and that client was not satisfied that it was getting the information it needed
when the need existed. And so, in 1995, Congress decided to look elsewhere for advice
and counsel on matters relating to S&T (Walker, 2001)." Walker would have been the
chairman formally inviting witnesses during the 104" Congress (1995-96). The
decreased number of the OTA witness appearances correlates to our expectation that the
GOP majority in Congress would call fewer OTA witnesses. While the OTA published
an increased number of reports in 1995, they were not utilized in Congress.

The House Committee on Science
Between 1972 and 1995, the OTA testified before twenty-eight House
committees, two joint committees, and twenty Senate committees, proving its broad
presence as a source of scientific information for Congress. The OTA testified in
hearings on a wide variety of issues, from oversight and budget renewal hearings to
hearings on robotics, telecommunications, satellites, and USSR-US relations. The OTA's
advice fostered debate and discussion from both sides of the issue. In an article in the
New York Times, September 24th,1995, Warren E. Leary stated, "During floor debates,
the agency's reports were often quoted by both sides of an issue, supporters say,
indicating that the agency was doing its job of supplying factual material to elevate the
discussion ( ~ e ' k y1995,26)."
,

The OTA appeared more times on the House Committee on Science than any
other committee in the Congress. Of the 639 appearances before congressional
committees, the OTA appeared before the House Committee on Science 129 times. In
general, the OTA appeared in front of House committees more often than Senate
Committees, with 416 House appearances and 213 Senate appearances, and 10 joint
committee appearances (see Table 1). The House Committee on Energy and Commerce
and the House and Senate appropriations committees also called upon the OTA's
expertise quite often, though not nearly as much as the House Committee on Science.
Moreover, the Energy and Commerce agenda was quite narrowly focused on energy
related issues and the appropriators mainly conducted oversight into expenditures.'
Table 1: OTA Appearances in Congressional Hearings
by Committee and Chamber: 1972-1995

Subsequent analysis shows that the majority of hearings before the Appropriations Committees can be
classified as purely fiscal requests, in which the OTA provided background on a particular budgetary issue.
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce is narrowly focused on issues pertaining to US energy
policy, public health, and foreign and domestic trade. While the categories of "energy" and "commerce"
are certainly relevant Issues of science policy, they do not encompass a broad range of the issues which are
pertinent to science policy.

* Titles for Senate committees with corresponding jurisdictions but different titles than
House committees are in parentheses
Note: The OTA also appeared before two joint committees: Joint Economic Committee
(8 times) and the Committee on the Organization of Congress (2 times).
The House Committee on Science, with its broad jurisdiction over all issues of
science and technology, is the best institution to analyze for a study interested in the
degree of politicization in science in the wake of the OTA. The House Committee on
Science (formerly the Science, Space and Technology Committee) is responsible for
facilitating much of the legislative debate with regard to science and technology policy.
Its official jurisdiction gives it responsibility "over all non-defense federal scientific
research and development (R&D)" and charges it to ensure "that Federal tax dollars are
being spent wisely and efficiently and that America's Federal science and technology
enterprise maintains its world preeminence." Additionally, the Committee is responsible
for proposing ways in which research and development can solve some of our nation's
most pressing problems.10 The specific focus on science and technology, yet broad

'Taken from the House Committee on Science website, accessed 16 December 2006,O€tic1al Jurisdiction
of the Committee, h t t D : / i w w w . h o u s e . e o v i s c i e n c e / e o m m i t t e e i n m ,
' O Ibid

jurisdiction over all issues pertaining to science and technology, makes the House
Committee on Science an appropriate committee to test my hypotheses.
As Figure 2, shows, the OTA appeared most often before this committee in the
1980s and early 1990s. The-number of OTA hearings appears to oscillate between five
and ten appearances per year during the ten year period before its downfall. The average
number of OTA hearings is approximate five per year, with a standard deviation of four.
The fmal substantive data point represents the year 1996, in which OTA produced its
final report, and appeared before six hearings in the Science Committee. Of course, the
OTA completely disappeared from the congressional scene on September 3oth,1995.
Figure 2: OTA appearances before the House Committee on Science, 1970 to 1995
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Issues before the House Committee on Science
The OTA demonstrated significant presence on the House Committee on Science
on numerous issues ranging from animal testing standards to health care, to DOE budget
and program reauthorization, to global warming and energy policies. Figure 3

demonstrates the subjects on which the OTA testified most frequently (3 or more
appearances) before the House Committee on Science. I selected three issues: NASA,
Superfund (part of hazardous waste) and global warming." I based my selection on the
consistency of the issue, before and after the fall of the OTA, the current relevance of the
issue, and the OTA's presence on the issue. The issues range on a political spectrum
from politically neutral in the case of NASA, to politically divided in the case of global
warming. Superfund falls in the middle of the spectrum. Mooney hypothesizes that the
politicization of science is comprehensive, across a wide range of issues. However, it is
distinctly possible that the inherent political divide on the issues might affect the external
politicization of the witness testimony.

LI

Since the OTA testified more on DOE issues than any other issue, I considered using DOE for this study.
Most DOE hearings pertained to a DOE budget renewal and OTA witnesses spoke about the degree of
efficiency or lack thereof of the in DOE programs. Six out of the nine OTA appearances on the DOE are
fiscal year DOE authorizations. While the terminology by which the congressional hearings are entitled
changes in 1992 from "DOE Authorization" to "DOE Budget Authorization," the content is, for all
practical puIposes, the same. The issues surrounding the DOE Budget authorization are roughly similar
each year. However, the OTA does not testify in every hearing on DOE authorization during the years
between 1985 and 1995, and in fact, does not even testify in a large portion of the hearings on DOE
authorization. The OTA testifies in six out of the sixty-five hearings (slightly less than 10 percent) on this
subject before the House Committee on Science between the years of 1985 and 1995. While in every other
way, this issue would be ripe for consideration, the OTA's limited presence in these hearings makes it
difficult to draw any conclusions about the politicization of scientific advice which direetly link to the
demise of OTA.

Figure 3: OTA Appearances before the House Committee on Science, by Subject,
between 1972 and 1995
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I collect data kom a standard time interval of ten years before the demise of the
OTA (Jan. 1985-Sept. 1995) and ten years after the downfall of the OTA (Sept. 1995Dec. 2005)

Case Study 1: NASA Authorizations
NASA authorizations are the second most frequently addressed subject on
which the OTA testifies before the Science Committee. Ideally, congressional
testimony on this issue should remain unaffected by the fall of the OTA. There is
very little motivation for "twisting" the science; therefore, the witnesses'
testimonies and the types of witnesses should not be significantly altered in the
presence of a GOP majority. In 1958, Congressed passed the National

Aeronautics and Space ~ c t " ,authorizing the creation of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA). Section 102 of the Act lays out the goals and
objectives of the agency, stating,
(a) The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United
States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful
purposes for the benefit of all mankind.
(b) The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of
the United States require that adequate provision be made for
aeronautical and space activities (NAS Act, 1958, Sec. 102).
The act further specifies the responsibilities and functions of the agency in section 202 as,
"(1) plan, direct, and conduct aeronautical and space activities; (2) arrange

for participation by the scientific community in planning scientific
measurements and observations to be made through use of aeronautical
and space vehicles, and conduct or arrange for the conduct of such
measurements and observations; (3) provide for the widest practicable and
appropriate dissemination of information concerning its activities and the
results thereof; (4) seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible,
the fullest commercial use of space; and (5) encourage and provide for
Federal Government use of commercially provided space services and
hardware, consistent with the requirements of the Federal Government."
More important to this case study on NASA authorizations, the 1958 Act specifies
in section 310:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the authorization of any
appropriation to the Administration shall expire (unless an earlier
expiration is specifically provided) at the close of the third fiscal year
following the fiscal year in which the authorization was enacted, to the
extent that such appropriation has not theretofore actually been made."
Further, section 206 requires that the NASA Director report to Congress once a
year with "a comprehensive description of the programmed activities and the
accomplishments" and "an evaluation of such activities and accomplishments in terms of
the attainment of, or the failure to attain, the objectives described in section 102(c) of this
" TheNational Aeronautics and Space Act, Pub. L. No. 85 568,72 Stat. 426 438 (July. 29, 1958), As
Amended. Accessed from the web, 21 Mareh 2007,
http:llwww.nasa.aovlofficesloaclaboutisoaceactl.htm1

~ c t . " This
' ~ legislation sets the stage for the annual or semi-annual reports that I am
studying. In essence, each hearing represents the testimony of the director of NASA to
Congress on the previous year, and his or her request for funding in support of anticipated
programs for the coming year. He or she seeks to validate the work that NASA has done
and demonstrate that NASA's endeavors deserve to be funded in the upconiing year.
The majority of the OTA testimonies on NASA are focused on NASA
authorization hearings. In this case, the OTA testifies on four out of twenty-one hearings
(slightly less than 20 percent) on NASA authorization between 1985 and 1995. The OTA
also authored 21 reports on the subject of Space and Space Exploration, with four
specifically focused on NASA policies. NASA budgets are eligible for re-evaluation
every year. Further, NASA continued to play an important role in the development and
research surrounding space exploration and earth sciences after 1995. Lisa J. Porter, the
Associate Administrator of the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate at NASA
stated in September 2006,
"Today, NASA's aeronautics research programs are positioned better than
ever to provide meaningful and relevant research that is aligned with our
National priorities. We are conducting high-quality, innovative, integrated
research across the fundamental disciplines of aeronautics, creating
revolutionary tools, concepts, and technologies that will lead to a safer,
more environmentally friendly, and more efficient national air
transportation system. At the same time, we are ensuring that aeronautics
research and critical core competencies continue to play a vital role in
~l
refocused
support of the Vision for space Exploration. ~ a s t lNASA's
aeronautics program is establishing strong partnerships with academia,
industry and other Government agencies, and in doing so, we are ensuring
that our world-class resources are readily available to them."I4

ibid
Lisa J. Porter, Testimony before the House Committee on Science, Space and Aeronautics
Subcommittee, September 26,2006
l3

l4

Thus, NASA authorizations are a good case for this study: the hearing issues are constant
over time, the OTA has a significant presence on the issue, before the House Committee
on Science, and the case maintains significance before the Science Committee after the
demise of the OTA.
There are twenty-six hearings on NASA Authorization which I consider in this
statistical analysis, fifteen of which are Volume I1 hearings.15The Volume I and Volume

11hearings are similar in content; the second volume is merely a continuation of the
hearing in the previous volume. NASA authorization is the least politically charged issue
that I analyzed. The case represents the baseline for my analysis because I can apply the
controls most effectively: the hearings are on the same issues, every year; the witnesses
are very similar in affiliation and type; there is very little inherent political leaning in the
issue itself; and the House Committee on Science hears most of testimonies on this issue.

Case Study 2: Superfund
The third and fourth issues in which the OTA presents significant testimony
before the House Committee on Science are issues of energy and hazardous waste
While both would be beneficial to study, the issue of energy is far too broad to focus a
case study effectively: there is not a well-defined, narrow area of energy policy which
lends itself to a carefully focused and systematic study of the OTA. In general, OTA
reports on this subject were broad, including topics such as Energv in Developing
Countries and Energv Use and the US Economy. Further, the OTA is not a particularly
significant witness on this issue: there are five OTA appearances on energy policy

''

I choose to focus the analysis that I present here on the Volume I1 hearings because the number of
witnesses in Vol. I and Vol. I1 hearings is vastly different, yielding signiiicant statistical error, were I to
consider both types in the same study. I selected Vol. I1 as opposed to Vol. I because (a) the OTA appears
in Vol. I1 hearings, and (b) there are statistically fewer witnesses overall in Vol. I hearings, lending fewer
available data points.

between 1985 and 1995, out of a total of forty-one hearings on energy policy,
withstanding hearings on the Department of Energy (DOE) budget authorizations. As a
result, I chose instead to center on issues broadly categorized as hazardous waste, and
specifically focused on the Superfund development.
Background on Superfund
The Superfund was created in 1980, under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability (CERCLA) Act, which is more commonly known
as the " ~ u ~ e r f u n d "The
. ' ~ Superfund is a focused and narrow part of the congressional
dialogue about hazardous waste, centering on environmental cleanup, specifically for
organizations that cannot self-fund the necessary measures of environmental action. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines it as follows:
"Congress established a Hazardous Substance Trust Fund, referred to as
"Superfund," to pay for responses by the federal government to releases of
hazardous substances in cases in which there are no viable potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) or the PRPs are unable to pay for the response.
EPA's "enforcement first" philosophy is designed to conserve Fund
monies for such circumstances. In some cases, such as emergency actions,
resources of the Fund are used to conduct cleanup, after which EPA
pursues cost recovery from the responsible parties. The term "Superfund"
is also often used to refer to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), the law that created the
Superfund cleanup program."'7
The Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety, and Security summarized the
CERCLA Act as follows:
Under CERCLA Congress gave the federal government broad authority to
regulate hazardous substances, to respond to hazardous substance
emergencies, and to develop long-term solutions for the Nation's most
serious hazardous waste problems. CERCLA also created a $1.6 billion
I6

Last Accessed April 3, 2007. htl~://www.epa.eov/suuerfund/actionilaw/cercla.htm

Questions and Answers, taken fiom the w e b 2 March 2007,
httD://www.epa.eov/comuliance/resources/faas/cleanu~/super~~~en-faas.html
" EPA

Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund. This fund, supported by an
excise tax on feedstock chemicals and petroleum, was used to pay for
cleanup activities at abandoned waste sites. The 1980 law requires the
parties responsible for the contamination to conduct or pay for the
cleanup. If the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) efforts to take
an enforcement action for the cleanup are not successful, the federal
government can clean up a site using the CERCLA Trust Fund. If the
Superfund program conducts the cleanup, the government can take court
action against responsible parties to recover up to three times the cleanup
costs.18
The National Contingency Plan (NCP) [40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR]
part 3001'~guides the CERCLA response efforts, outlining two basic responses: removal
action and remedial action.

emo oval actions focus on the immediate elimination,

containment, treatment, disposal, or incineration of the hazardous waste in question.
Remedial actions make up the majority of Superfund efforts and center upon creating a
system of longer-term, sustainable solutions. Specific actions falling in this category
include preliminary analysis, site inspections, the Hazard Ranking System (HRS), the
National Priorities List (NPL), a feasibility study, and the actual remedial action.''
The Superfund legislation was reauthorized in 1986 and its standards of
environmental efficiency were extended to include federal government facilities as well
as private industries. The act was amended again in 1992, 1994, 1997,1999, and 2002
with increased definitions for allowable actions, specifically on federally owned facilities.
While Superfund receives portions of its revenue from the Trust Fund, it depends on
yearly congressional authorizations to maintain its existence, receiving roughly fifty
percent of its budget from general revenues.
The OTA testified in two out of seven total hearings on Superfund,
between 1985 and 1995. Hazardous waste, specifically limited to

'' Last Accessed April 4,2007. h t t D : / / h o m e r . o m l . a o v / n u c l e a r s a f e t v / n s e a /
''
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Superfund issues, was the focus of four OTA reports, between 1985 and
1989. The Superfund maintains its prominence after 1995; between 1995
and 2005 there are two subsequent hearings on this subject before the
Science Committee.
The OTA testifies in a significant portion (more than 20 percent) of the hearings on the
Superfund prior to 1995.
The majority of the Superfund hearings which I consider focus on Research and
Development (R&D) issues (7 out of 14 hearings), authorization of funding (2 out of 14
hearings), or specific cleanup issues (5 out of 14 hearings). Superfimd is slightly more
politically contentious than the NASA Authorization hearings because the issues are
more environmentally sensitive, and span a wider range of actions than reviewing
authorizations. The issues and technology remain relatively constant over the 20 year
period. In comparison to the NASA authorizations, the Superfimd legislation has a leftward leaning and contains a wider range of content. This case provides a good study of
the OTA's presence before Congress because the OTA has played a significant historic
role in the development of Superfimd Policy.
The Superfund is another good case study because the issue is addressed directly
by the OTA and remains relevant even after the OTA disappears. Further, the OTA
testifies in a significant portion (more than 20 percent) of the hearings on the Superfimd
prior to 1995.

Case Study 3: Global Warming
The issue of global warming often seems like it is over-emphasized in discussions
of politicized science. However, to a certain degree, ignoring this issue would be
equivalent to overlooking the metaphorical "elephant in the room." Thus, I selected
global warming as a third case study.

Chris Mooney titles his chapter on global warming "The Greatest Hoax," calling
Senator James Inhofe's "scientific" speeches on the issue, in the words of Geophysical
Fluid Dynamics Laboratory director Jerry D. Mahlman, "the kind of thing you write
Monty Python skits about (Mooney, 2005,84)." Until the end of the 2othcentury, there
was very little consensus surrounding the issue of global warming, even in the scientific
community. Even today, debate surrounding the issue is heated, particularly concerning
the role of human activities in the production of greenhouse gases.
In 2001, the National Academy of the Sciences published a monumental report
on the matter, stating confidently that
"Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of
human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean
temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising. The changes
observed over the last several decades are likely mostly due to human
activities, but we cannot rule out that some significant part of these
changes are also a reflection of natural variability. Human-induced
warming and associated sea level rises are expected to continue through
the 21st century (NRC, 2001, I)."
Global warming is defined as the observed increase in the average temperature of
the earth's oceans and atmosphere. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration indicated in their 2001 "State of the Climate" report (Shein, 2006,
S l l ) that "based on the N O M C D C record, the rise in global surface
temperatures since 1900 is 0.66"C, when calculated as a linear trend."
The key to understanding global warming is a basic comprehension of the
greenhouse effect. The greenhouse effect has to do with the absorption and emission of
solar, thermal, and infrared radiation. In essence, the amount of thermal radiation that the
earth emits (upward radiation) has to be equal to the amount of solar radiation that the
earth receives from the sun and the amount of infrared radiation which is reflected back

to the earth by the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This is based on the basic laws of
physics (Conservation of Energy, Stefan-Boltzmann Law of Blackbody radiation). If for
some reason, the earth merely absorbed all of the sun's radiation; it would become
infinitely hot and uninhabitable. Rather, the earth absorbs the energy and then reflects
about 30% of the sun's radiation back into space. Greenhouse gases, in the earth's
atmosphere, trap some of the upward thermal radiation, re-emitting it back down to the
earth's surface, causing the surface of the earth to heat up. The greater the concentration
of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere, the more the earth warns up to balance
the influx of thermal and infixed radiation. The greenhouse effect is presented on the
EPA website with the following diagram and e ~ ~ l a n a t i o n : ~ '
Figure 4: Greenhouse House Effect, EPA Diagram
The Greenhouse Effect

The Greenhouse Effect is beneficial to the inhabitants of the earth; it keeps the
planet about 60 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than it would be otherwise, making the planet
livable.22 However, if the greenhouse gases were to increase substantially, the
inhabitants of the earth might find themselves with an atmosphere similar to that of
Venus, with temperatures reaching nearly 800 degrees Fahrenheit. Venus has a very
2I

2l
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thick greenhouse layer, reflecting most of the emitted thermal radiation back down to its
surface, causing temperatures to rise exponentially.
The EPA notes on their website2' (updated 19 October 2006) that scientists know
with certainty that:
Human activities are changing the composition of Earth's atmosphere. Increasing
levels of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere since preindustrialtimes are well-documented and understood.
The atmospheric buildup of CO2 and other greenhouse gases is largely the result
of human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels.
A warming trend of about 0.7 to 1.5"foccurred during the 20th century.
Warming- occurred in both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, and over the
oceans (NRC, 2001).
The major greenhouse gases emitted by human activities remain in the
atmosphere for periods ranging from decades to centuries. It is therefore virtually
certain that atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases will continue to rise
over the next few decades. Increasing greenhouse gas concentrations tend to
warm the planet.
Dr. Jim Hansen, one of the world's leading climate scientists, observed in 2004, that the
primary cause of the global warming phenomena is human-made greenhouse gases,
"The largest change of climate forcings in recent centuries is caused by
human-made greenhouse gases. Greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
absorb heat radiation rather than letting it escape into space. In effect, they
make the proverbial blanket thicker, returning more heat toward the
ground rather than letting it escape to space. The earth then is radiating
less energy to space than it absorbs from the sun. This temporary planetary
energy imbalance results in the earth's gradual warming (Hansen, 2004,
71)"
The principal source of greenhouse gases comes from power processes, followed by
industrial waste, and transportation fuels. Carbon dioxide is the most common
greenhouse gas, with methane and nitrous oxide coming in second and third (IPCC
Report, 2001). Water vapor and ozone also contribute significantly to the overall
greenhouse gas concentration.
23
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What scientists do not know is how serious the consequences of global warming
will be, or how fast the temperature will change with increasing concentrations of
greenhouse gases. Skeptics argue that a temperature change of less than a degree in the
last century cannot have detrimental environmental impacts. Further, they argue that
little is known about the seriousness of a few degrees increase in temperature. Global
warming naturally raises controversy over its scientific validity, the depth of its gravity,
and its potential impacts. Most policy debate surrounding the issue pertains to (a) the
human role in the production of greenhouse gases, (b) the actions which should be taken
against it, and (c) the validity of the science. The hearings which I consider on this issue
consider similar policy debates. I look at 17 hearings on global warming, with titles such
as "Nuclear Energy's Role: Improving U.S. Energy Security and Reducing Greenhouse
Gas Emissions" and "Priorities in Global Climate Change Research." Thus, in spite of
the scientific consensus on the presence and causes of global warming, uncertainty about
its consequences subjects the issue to politics.
Chris Mooney terms the issue of global warming "The Greatest Hoax," accusing
Republican James Inhofe (Mooney, 2005,78) of following a strategy of "find experts
'sympathetic to your view' and make them 'part of your message."' Further, Mooney
suggests that Inhofe even goes as far as "manufacturing uncertainty" about Global
Climate Change (82) and suppressing truth (95). The picture which Mooney paints of
Inhofe is of a slightly deranged man, shouting "hoax" at every available moment.
Mooney charges conservative scientists with having industry ties (Mooney, 2005, 87),
congressmen with "stacking the bench" with their own experts (88), and the right with
misinterpreting scientific fact (89). Mooney (92) states of Inhofe that he "...should not

be allowed to pick and choose which parts . .. he likes or doesn't like." Mooney's

)

criticism (2005, 101) is severe, as he states,
"If this situation is maddening, it is also tragic. There may be no other
issue today where a corruption of the necessary relationship between
science and political decision-making has more potentially disastrous
consequences. And together, James Inhofe and the Bush administration
have made that corruption systematic and complete. Not only do they
strive to prevent the public from understanding the gravity of the climate
situation, but in sowing confusion and uncertainty, they help prevent us
from doing anything about it."
Mooney's analysis is based on the individual interactions with or actions of
policymakers and the administration. He does not conduct his analysis in a systematic
way; rather he shows that the GOP Congress did rely on somewhat questionable evidence
for its stance on global warming. Regardless of his sources or method, if this conclusion
is correct, the implications for science policy decision making are grave. The deliberate
twisting of science for a given agenda is unacceptable, especially when it is done by those
in political power. If Mooney is correct, then hearings on global warming should become
more politicized after 1994.
The OTA appears as a witness in three out of eight hearings on global warming
before the Science Committee between 1985 and 1995, and this issue is the main topic of
four OTA reports, between 1991 and 1993. Global warming is subsequently addressed in
the House Committee on Science in nine hearings after the demise of the OTA, between
1995 and 2005. Although global warming is not the most frequently addressed subject
by OTA or the House Committee on Science, the issue is high on the list of national
priorities and, to some extent, still divides the parties. President George W. Bush, in his
2007 State of the Union address recognized global warming as a "serious challenge,"
saying "America is on the verge of technological breakthroughs that will enable us to live

our lives less dependent on oil. And these technologies will help us be better stewards of
the environment, and they will help us to confront the serious challenge of global climate
change (Bush, 2007)." Yet, in spite of Bush's recent interest in global warming, several
prominent conservative Republicans dispute the scientific consensus that human
activities contribute to global warming, while prominent Democrats traditionally
advocate measures to reduce global warming. Global warming is quite often the issue
used to demonstrate politicization of science.
The subject of global warming is by far the most controversial of the three case
studies which I have selected. On a continuum ranking the degree of political divisions
within my issues, global warming falls at the far left, as the most politically divided issue
that I consider. It is often accused of being a left-wing issue, promoted by liberals and
environmentalists, such as A1 Gore (An Inconvenient Truth). I chose to focus on this issue
as the third case study because of the accusations of its politicization. I use the analysis
fiom the NASA and Superfund hearings to establish a model for the global warming data.

I approach this controversial subject systematically, basing my analysis on the cases of
NASA Authorization and Superfund so that the analysis of Global warming is as biasfree as possible.
Conclusion
Because of the innately politicized nature of global warming, it serves as a critical
test case for my analysis. If science policy has became more politicized on Capital Hill
with the rise of the Republican majority in the House after 1994, then hearings before the
House Committee on Science are likely to reflect this development. The other two case
studies are less politically divided and as a result, they would be less susceptible to

politicization. The first two case studies provide a measure of the politicization and
policy change which occurred as a result of the downfall of the OTA. Using this
baseline, I can systematically look at the more contentious issue of global warming.
I have selected these three case studies as such because they enable me to

maximize control over the variables in my study and achieve an ideal variability across
the issues. By controlling for the committee and establishing case studies in which the
OTA had a significant presence prior to its demise, I create a systematic method of study
in which I can effectively quantify the change in the sources which Congress relies upon
for scientific information. In the next chapter, I put my hypotheses to the test by
analyzing the sources of information that Congress relies upon in the areas of NASA
authorizations, Superfund, and global warming.

CHAPTER 111: CASE STUDIES

If the demise of the OTA and the emergence of a Republican majority in the
House of Representatives led to a politicization of science, we should observe changes in
policy deliberation on the House Committee on Science. First, the Committee would
receive more of its information from politicized sources. Second, the organizations that
testified from 1995 to 2005 would not substitute for the OTA's objective and unbiased
information to Congress from 1972 to 1995. Third, we would see an increase in the
number of organizations that endorse GOP-specific priorities. This chapter tests these
hypotheses by comparing the types of witnesses which are called to testify on the House
Committee on Science for NASA authorization, Superfund, and global warming before
and after the demise of the OTA. This comparison allows me to characterize the change
in the sources of scientific information after the fall of the OTA. The w~tnessesare
placed in one of seven categories: academic, government, industry, interest group,
laboratory, research, or other. I begin by defining these categories. Then I analyze
changes in the presence of each type of witness in committee testimony for all three
issues from 1985 to 2005. The data support my first and second hypothesis in one of
three cases, and support the third in all three cases.
Types of Witnesses

The types of w~tnessesto appear before the House Committee on Science can be
classified in terms of seven categories: (1) Academic, (2) Laboratory, (3) Research, (4)
Interest Group, (5) Industry, (6) Government, and (7) Other. I use these characterizations
for all three case studies. Further, I separate the witness classifications based around the
definition of "politicization" which I used to create the hypothesis in chapter I, further

expounded in this section. Though witnesses from each of the seven categories have
distinct characteristics, the witness classifications of interest group and industry can be
combined as "politicized" witnesses; the witness categories of academic, laboratory, and
research can be combined to form "non-politicized" witnesses. Government and other
witnesses are classified in a separate category. The government witnesses, in particular,
are separated out because they represent a mixed degree of politicization: some of the
government witnesses are political appointees, rendering them inherently politically
defined; others are research scientists employed by the government. This category
cannot be neatly summarized as politicized or non-politicized.
The academic category indicates an individual or organization which is affiliated
with a university or college. These are individuals such as faculty of universities,
professors, and members of associations of universities. An example of this classification
can be seen in the case study of NASA Authorization, under witness Peter M. Banks,
who is given the title of "Electrical Engineering Professor, Stanford University."
Academic witnesses are typically either professors of physics or related earth sciences.
There are exceptions to this rule, however, including one political science professor

(W.D. Kay) who was called as a witness in the 1997 NASA Authorization. Though
academic witnesses are associated with a college or university, they speak with
independent voices.
Laboratory witnesses are research scientists affiliated with national laboratories.
They appear almost exclusively in the hearings on global warming. These witnesses are
research scientists who are not affiliated with a university or college, but instead are part
of a research collaboration at a national laboratory. Examples of this type of witness

include John T. Whetten, Associate Director of Energy and Technology at Los Alamos
National Laboratory, and Charles V. Shank, the Director of Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory.
The activities surrounding the research category are the focus of this particular
study. If Chris Mooney is correct and science policy is becoming less research-based,
and more deeply politicized, we expect to see the most change within this category.
Research-based witnesses include those who are affiliated with the four sources of
congressional research science as specified by Bruce Bimber (28): the GAO, the CRS,
the CBO, and the OTA. In addition, research witnesses include those from the National
Academy of the Sciences (NAS), the National Research Council (NRC), or non-partisan
think tanks and research institutes such as the Scripps Institute for Oceanography.
Finally, academic witnesses are distinguished from research witnesses because they are
not expressly linked to a congressional research service, or to an organization whose
unique purpose is to provide research and information.
The academic, laboratory, and research witnesses make up the group of witnesses
classified as "unbiased" or "non-politicized." While scientists can certainly have agendas
or biases, as highlighted by F. James Sensenbrenner in chapter 1, they are far less likely
to be politically swayed than individuals who are either directly affiliated with a
government agency, or receive their primary salaries from a group with a particular
political agenda, or a corporation which has a financial stake in the decision- outcome.
Interest group witnesses are typically affiliated with advocacy groups, which
focus on a specific topic or area of policy, and do not produce a good or service.
Examples of this type of witness could be Steven H. Flajser, the chairman of the

Aerospace R&D Committee at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE), and Lori B. Garver, who is the Executive Director of the National Space Society
(NSS). The IEEE defmes itself as, "a non-profit organization.. . the world's leading
professional association for the advancement of technology."24Similarly, the NSS
purpose statement, says that "The National Space Society (NSS) is an independent,
educational, grassroots nonprofit organization dedicated to the creation of a space-faring
civilizati~n."~~
Interest groups are distinguished from research organizations in that they
are narrowly focused on a specific issue or area of interest, and the information they
provide reflects their particular interests. This category would also include unions and
non-governmental coalitions and councils.

An industry-related witness receives a salary from an organization or corporation
which produces a good or service used by or under scrutiny the individuals affiliated with
the issue in question. Good examples of industry witnesses can be seen in the global
warming hearings under Robert C. Berglund, the manager of the Advanced ~ u c l e a r
Technology Operations at General Electric Co., and L. Daniel Mears, who is the General
Manager of Gas-Cooled Reactor Associates. These are differentiated from the interest
group witnesses, which do not produce a good or service and are devoted to advocacy for
a particular field. More importantly, industry groups are often distinguished from the
interest groups in tams of profit: industry groups make a profit; often interest groups do
not.
The categories of interest group and industry are defined as the innately
"politicized" witnesses. These groups may use scientific findings, but they advocate
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positions based on their group's concerns or their business interests. They do not provide
unbiased analysis, but are generally called because they have a specific advocacy interest
in the topic of debate.
The government witnesses receive their primary salary from a specific
governmental agency or department. This category would include witnesses who are
affiliated with NASA, the Air Force, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), the Department of Commerce, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Defense, state and local
government officials, and Representatives and Senators. This category also includes
agencies such as the Office of Budget Management (OMB) and the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP), whose administrators are appointed by the

resident.^^

Though OMB and OSTP are the executive parallel to Bimber's four legislative research
organizations, the heads of the agency are political appointees, and their primary budget
source is governmental. Thus, they are categorized as government witnesses.
Government witnesses are classified in their own separate category of
politicization. A number of government officials are political appointees, such as the
NASA Administrator, a position filled by President George H.W. Bush's appointee,
Danfel Goldin. The heads of the OMB, OSTP, and NSF are also appointed by the
President. While their appointment have to be confirmed by the Senate, the nature of
their relationship to the administration in power necessitates that they are considered
separately from the other witnesses. These positions are designed to be politically

26 There are a

few notable exceptions to the "Government" classification.These include the Congressional
Researeh Service (CRS), the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
and the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), which B N C Bimber
~
characterizes as government
research organizations which pro~ideobjective. independent advice to Congess (Bimbr, 1996, p.28).
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unbiased; however, by nature the heads of each agency are distinctly affiliated with an
administration of a particular political party Thus, govemment witnesses are considered
separately from "politicized" and "non-politicized" categories.
Finally, the categorization of other is used to delineate sources which do not
clearly fit into any other category. These anomalies include witnesses such as Richard
Rhodes, a journalist and historian; Valeri A. Troitskaya, the chairman of the Scientific
Council for Geomagnetism at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, USSR; or Gail Hanks,
whose affiliation is "registered nurse." This classification is somewhat of a broad "catchall" category, designed to reduce the number of categories to a manageable number; as
such, it cannot be reliably defined in terms of biased or unbiased motives. Using these
categories, we can analyze the hearings on NASA authorization, Superfund, and global
warming.

Data Analysis
The politicization of science, as understood throughout this study, can be
measured by an increase in the overall percentages of interest group and industry related
witnesses before the House Committee on Science. I analyze the overall witness trends
for each issue, before and after the fall of the OTA. First, I separate the types of
witnesses into four categories: politicized witnesses (industry and interest groups), nonpoliticized witnesses (academic, laboratory, and research), government witnesses, and
"other" witnesses. Then I compare the different sources to determine if scientific
information has become more politicized with the fall of the OTA, demonstrated in
Tables 1,2, and 3.

Table 1: Politicization in NASA Authorizations, pre & post OTA
OTA Post-OTA
Politicization of NASA Witnesses
157 (58%)
40 (52%)
Government
32 (12%)
20 (26%)
Non-Politicized
17 (22%)
76 (28%)
Politicized
Other
0 (0%)
7 (2%)
272 (100%)
77 (100%)
Total
Number of Witnesses (Percentage of total witnesses)

.

Table 2: Politicization in Superfund, pre & post OTA
I OTA
/ Post-OTA
Politicization of Superfund Witnesses
54 (46%) 1
6 (60%)
Government
II (9%)
3 (30%)
Non-Politicized
I(10%)
48 (40%)
Politicized
Other
0 (0%)
8 (5%)
119 (100%)
I 0 (100%)
Total
Number of Witnesses (Percentage of total witnesses)
Table 3: Politicization in Global Warming, pre &post OTA
I OTA
I POST-OTA

I Politicization of Global Warming Witnesses
Other
Total

.

(

4 (4%)
102 (100%)

1

1

I

2 (3%)
61 (100%)

Number of Witnesses (Percentage of total witnesses)

From these data, we can state that in the cases of NASA and Superfund, the witness
trends indicate a decrease in the politicization of scientific information. In the case of
NASA authorizations, the decrease in politicization occurs simultaneously with a
decrease in the percentage of government witnesses. In the case of Superfund, we see an
increase in the percentage of government witnesses. In the case of global warming, the
witness trends designate an increase in the politicization of scientific advice, as well as an
increase in the percentage of government witnesses.

A second trend which emerges from the data is an overall decrease in the number
of witnesses and hearings on each of these issues. In the case of NASA, the number of
witnesses is reduced by a factor of four; in the case of Superfund, the number of

witnesses drops by a factor of twelve; finally, in the case of global warming, the number
of witnesses is halved. The number of hearings on NASA (eleven before, four after) and
Superfund (eleven before, three after) also decreases. In the case of global warming, the
number of hearings actually increases after 1995 (seven before, ten after) but the number
of witnesses decreases by a factor of two. This trend is striking, because it indicates that
Congress is not just calling its own witnesses; it is also blatantly not calling witnesses.
Based on the results in these general categories, I infer that my initial hypothesis
is only partially correct. The increase in politicization for global warming [Tables 3 and

61 is consistent with my expectations, but the witnesses for Superfund and NASA do not
follow the expected trends. Yet, because so much change under NASA occurs in the
govemment category, which may contain either biased or unbiased sources, we should
take a closer look at movements within the specific categories. A more refined analysis is
necessary to provide the details necessary to fully analyze the change in the politicization
of science. I separate the categories of "politicized," "non-politicized" and "govemment"
into the seven original categories, and look more specifically at the witness affiliations
and organizations which are present in the hearings.
My analysis examines three trends: (1) the percentages of witnesses by type,
before and after the demise of the OTA, (2) the research-based witness trends; and (3) the
particular witnesses in the govemment and interest group data.
Witness Percentages Before and After the OTA

The frst stage of analysis compares the overall percentages of witnesses by
category, before the fall of the OTA and after the fall of the OTA. This stage of the
analysis allows me to observe the difference in the overall percentages on both sides of

the transition year. Table 4 demonstrates the percentages per category for NASA
Authorizations before 1995 in comparison to the percentages per category after 1995.
Table 4: Witness Type Trends for Vol. I1NASA Authorization hearings, pre & post 1995
Witness Type
OTA
I POST-OTA
Academic
1 13(5%) 1 11(14%)
157 (58%)
40 (52%)
Government
27 (10%)
Industry
5 (6%)
12 (16%)
49 (18%)
Interest Group
Laboratory
3 (1%)
0 (0%)
Other
7 (3%)
0 (0%)
16 (6%)
Research
9 (12%)
I Total
1 272 (100%) 1 77 (100%) 1
Number of Witnesses (Percentage of total witnesses)
The contrast between the percentages of witnesses during the time of the OTA and after
the OTA is highlighted in Table 4. The percentage of academic witnesses triples and the
number of research witnesses doubles after 1995; the percentages of government,
industry, and interest group witnesses decrease slightly; and the miniscule number of
laboratory witnesses disappears completely, as do those classified as "other."
The results of superfund hearings are presented in Table 5. I apply the same form
of analysis to these as to the NASA authorization hearings.
Table 5: Witness Type Trends for Superfund Hearings, pre & post 1995
Government
Laboratory
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
Other
6 (5%)
0 (0%)
Research
3 (30%)
8 (7%)
119 (100%)
10 ( 100%)
Total
Number of Witnesses (Percentage of total witnesses)

.

The data in Table 5 show that the percentage of academic, industry, and "other"
witnesses disappears completely; the percentage of interest group witnesses decreases
significantly, and the number of research witnesses increases substantially. The overall

percentage of government witnesses also increases. These findings are similar to those
for the NASA authorizations, with the exception of the government and academic
percentages, which follow opposite trend lines. The key point fiom this section of
analysis is that both cases reflect an increase in the percentage of research based
witnesses and decreases in the percentages of industry and interest group witnesses.
The overall percentage trends for global warming are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Witness Type Trends for Global Warming, Pre & Post-1995
Witness Type
OTA POST-OTA
Academic
14 (14%)
9 (15%)
Government
28 (27%)
25 (41%)
15 (15%)
Industry
2 (3%)
Interest Group
16 (26%)
8 (8%)
Laboratory
11 (11%)
0 (0%)
Other
4 (4%)
2 (3%)
Research
22 (21%)
7 (11%)
Total

102 (100%)

61 (100%)

Number of Witnesses (Percentage of total witnesses)
Table 6 demonstrates that the percentage of government witnesses increased
substantially, fiom 27%pre-1995 to 41% post-1995. Similarly, the percentages of
research, industry, and "other" witnesses decreased substantially in the years following
the OTA. The percentage of academic witnesses remained reasonably constantly, while
the percentage of laboratory witnesses disappeared entirely. The two unique trends
within this data set are the increased percentage of interest group witnesses, and the
decreased percentage of research-based witnesses. These trends do not mirror those
observed in the NASA data or the Superfund data.

In all three cases, the percentage of industry groups, laboratory groups, and
"other" witnesses decreases after 1995. The increase in the percentage of interest group
witnesses for global warming is expected, but the concurrent increase in the percentage of
academic witnesses is surprising. Mooney's suggestion is that Congress recruits

academics with industry-backing, to fill this category. This claim, however, is not
investigated in depth within this study.
Finally, consideration of the witness percentages across the three issues
demonstrates that the general percentage of government witnesses is higher for NASA
and superfund hearings. In both cases, before and after, the percentage of government
witnesses is around 50 percent. In contrast, global warming hearings call roughly 30
percent of their witnesses kom the government. Interest group witnesses make up
between 10 and 20 percent of the witnesses for NASA and Superfund, whereas they
constitute 10 percent for global warmingprior to 1995 and approximately 30 percent
after 1995. In other words, while the data indicate a significant change in the
politicization of the global warming issue, it is not completely valid to say that global
warming is more politicized than NASA or superfund. Rather, the data show that the
change in politicization has been greater in the area of global warming
Research Witness Trends
The third stage of analysis looks specifically at the trends within the research
category. If the deliberation on the House Committee on Science became more
politicized after 1995, the type of information that the OTA provided would not be
replaced when the OTA disappeared kom the scene. The next stage of the analysis
allows me to consider whether the sources of OTA information were replaced, and if so,
which source of information served as the replacement.
Table 7 demonstrates the research witnesses present for the Volume 11NASA
hearings, categorized by the year of the hearing. Authorization hearings operate on the

basis o f a fiscal year; the hearing takes place a year before the authorization w i l l go into
effect. For example, a FY1998 hearing would take place in 1997.
Table 7: Research Witnesses by Affiliation, N A S A Authorization, 1985-2005
Hearing Date
Research Witnesses Present
Conaressional Budaet Office (CBO)
I
~ationalCenter foritmospheric ~esearch(NCAR)
National Research Council (NRC)
1985
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
National Research Council (NRC)
1986
National Academy of the Sciences (NAS)
1987
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
1987
None Present
None Present
1989
1990
None Present
1991
None Present
National Research Council (NRC)
1992
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
1993
1994
National Research Council (NRC)
Congressional Budget Off~ce(CBO)
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
1995
1996
National Research Council (NRC)
National Research Council (NRC)
1997
National Research Council (NRC)
I
Potomac Institute for ~ o l i c ~ ' ~ t u d(PIPS)
ies
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
1999
National Research Council (x 3) (NRC)
National Center for Geographical Information and Analysis (NCGIA)
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
2000

I

The National Research Council (NRC) is the most frequently appearing researchbased witness for N A S A Authorization, appearing in eight out o f fifteen authorization
hearings. The N R C and the OTA each appear in four out o f the eleven hearings prior to
1995. At least one o f them is present in every pre-1995 hearing in which a research
witness i s called. Prior to 1995, the N R C and the O T A appear to share the responsibility
o f representing the research-based opinion in N A S A Authorization hearings; neither
takes preeminence. After 1995, the N R C maintains the responsibilities which it shared

with the O T A prior t o 1995. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) appears as a

new witness in 1995, and returns in 2000; In addition, the committee calls on PIPS and
NCGIA, two non-profit research based organizations, post-1995.
The PIPS organization is particularly interesting. It makes every attempt
to be non-partisan, focusing specifically on broad issues related to science and
technology. PIPS identifies its purpose as:
"The Institute identifies and aggressively shepherds discussion on key
science and technology issues facing our society, providing in particular,
an academic forum for the study of related policy issues. From these
discussions and forums, we develop meaningful science and technology
policy options and ensure their implementation at the intersection of
business and government."27
The objectives of PIPS, while not as time-weathered as those of the OTA, appear
remarkably similar:
"First, we fiercely maintain objectivity and credibility, remaining
independent of any federal or state agency, and owing no special
allegiance to any single political party or private concern. This dedication
to fierce objectivity is evident in our motto, Integrum Se Servare. We
make every attempt to ensure that our work is conducted in an unbiased
manner, regardless of the opinions of sponsors, or even self-interest. This
often enables fruitful inquiries into issues that might otherwise be difficult
to assess. Second, we seek extensive collaboration with similar
organizations, as well as with industry, academia, and government, and we
work closely with Congress and the Executive ranch."^^
Stephanie L. Tennyson, of PIPS suggests that perhaps the similarities between the
OTA and PIPS are not unintentional. She writes,
"The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies is an independent, 501(c) (3),
not-for-profit public policy research institute founded in 1994 in the wake
of the disestablishment of the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA). The Institute identifies and aggressively shepherds
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discussion on key issues facing our society, particularly those associated
with innovation (Tennyson, 2004,3)."
The presence of PIPS, alongside the NRC and NCGIA, suggests that Congress
still feels the need for an objective source of scientific information similar to the
OTA. The NRC and the OTA appear to share responsibilities for a certain type of
testimony, prior to 1995; after 1995, the OTA disappears, and the NRC, PIPS, and
NCGIA take over the responsibility for that type of testimony.
Table 8 represents the affiliations of the research-based witnesses who were
called to give testimony on issues regarding the Superfund. These hearings differ slightly
from those on the NASA Authorization, because there are far fewer witnesses in each
hearing. Thus, the presence of one or two research witnesses in a hearing could represent
anywhere from nine percent of the total witnesses to thirty-three percent, depending on
the size of the hearing.
Table 8: Research Witnesses by Affiliation, Superfund Hearings 1985-2005
Research Witnesses Present
Officeof Technology Assessment (OTA)
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
None Present
None Present
None Present
Southwest Research and Information Center
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
None Present
None Present
Government Accountability Office(GAO)
Officeof Technology ~ssessment(OTA)
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
None Present
Government Accountability Office(GAO)
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Northeast Hazardous Substance Research Center (HSRC)

Hearing
Date
May-85
May-85
Jun-85
Oct-85
Jan-86

I
I

Apr-93
Nov-93
Dec-95
Mar-99
Oct-99

The OTA is by far the most commonly recognized research-witness on the issue
of Superfund, appearing six times in four out of fourteen hearings on the subject. The
GAO follows, with three appearances in three hearings. While the NASA Authorization
case shows a clear relationship between the NRC and the OTA roles, Superfund is not
nearly as clear cut. The GAO appears to be the closest corollary to an OTA replacement.
The other research-based sources are region-specific, and appear only in hearings with
regard to a particular geographic area. The Southwest Research and Information Center
is a regional center, "founded in 1971 for the purpose of providing information to the
public on the effects of energy development and resource exploitation on the people and
their cultures, lands, water, and air of New Mexico and the ~ o u t h w e s t . "Likewise,
~~
the
Northeast Hazardous Substance Research Center is one of five regional research centers,
existing for the express purpose of bringing together "researchers ffom a variety of
disciplines to collaborate on integrated research projects, which involve practical
problems of hazardous substance management as well as long-term, exploratory
research."30In the case of NASA, there are clear replacements in the category of research
in hearing testimonies post-OTA; in the case of Superfund, we can see a clear absence of

the OTA after 1995 with the GAO possibly providing an alternate source of information.

In other words, we see a partial substitution for the testimonies of the OTA, post-1995.
Table 9 details the presence of each research-based witness on the issue of global
warming.
Table 9: Research Witnesses by Affiliation, Global Warming, 1985-2005

I Research Witnesses Present
29 (Retrieved 28
'O

March 2007): httu://www.sric.ord
(Retrieved 28 March 2007): hm://www.hsrc.ord

I Hearing Date I

National Academy of the Sciences (NAS)
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR)
Ill Water Survey (IWS)
Scientific Research Society (SRS)
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
Resources for the Future (RF)
Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP)
Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC)
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
Rocky Mountain lnstitute (RMI)
Electric Power Research lnstitute (EPRI)
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
National Academy of the Sciences (NAS)
Solar Energy Research lnstitute (SERI)
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
National Academy of the Sciences (NAS)
Electric Power Research lnstitute (EPRI)
National Academy of the Sciences (NAS)
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO)
None Present
None Present
None Present
None Present
None Present
Nnne Present

I None Present
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
Coal Utilization Research Council (CURC)
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Nuclear Energy lnstitute (NEI)
National Research Council (NRC)

I
1

Nov-98
Nov-98
Sep-99
Sep-99
Oct-99

I Oct-00
I Jun-00

I

I

Jun-01
Jul-02

The interesting point to note from this table is that the OTA does not play a significant
role in testimony concerning the issue o f global warming. Even before 1995, the OTA
does not have much o f a presence o n this issue. In the years prior to 1995, the OTA
appears in three out o f eight hearings pertaining to global warming. It is often
accompanied b y the NAS. Prior to 1995, in hearings in which one o f these two is not
present, the research witnesses were often specifically geared toward a particular type o f
energy research, such as electric power, or solar energy. However, the hearings in 1991,

in which the research witnesses are specifically limited to a particular field o f energy

research, are general hearings on the issue of global warming. The heanngs are not
focused on a particular type of energy, which would necessitate witnesses explicitly
focused within a specific field.
The global warming hearings following the demise of the OTA often lack
research-based witnesses. There does not appear to be a specific pattern to the types of
witnesses in hearings on this subject; after 1995 the GAO appears twice, and the NEI
appears twice. While in the case of NASA we see a fairly clear replacement source for
the OTA, this is not the case for global warming, where there is an explicit drop in the
number of research witnesses. In the ten year period prior to 1995, every hearing on
global warming has at least one research-based witness present. In the years after 1995,
only four out of ten hearings on the subject have a research witness present. As the
trends from the first and second stage of analysis indicate, the numbers of laboratory and
academic witnesses are also greatly diminished. In other words, the purely research
based witnesses are not being replaced by academic or laboratory witnesses. Rather, they
appear to be replaced with government or interest group witnesses. This trend is the
closest example of punctuated equilibrium, in which the percentage of research witness
drops sharply from the GOP takeover of the House 1995 and concurrent demise of the
OTA.

In sum, this portion of the analysis reveals that in the case of NASA
Authorizations, the OTA had significant presence, but was replaced, upon its demise, by
the NRC, NCGIA and PIPS. The need for an OTA-like agency is revealed in the
presence of PIPS, after the disappearance of the OTA. This fact shows that Congress was
still looking for OTA-type information, even after the agency had been removed from the

Congressional scene. In the case of Superfund, the OTA played a substantial role and
appears to have been partially substituted by the GAO after 1995. Finally, in the case of
global warming, the OTA does not appear to have played a substantial role, even during
the years from 1985 to 1995. In the years immediately following 1995, there is a
complete absence of research witnesses. Not only is the OTA not replaced, but the other
research witnesses which had been present alongside the OTA also disappeared.
Government and Interest Group Categories
The consideration of the research-based witnesses allows us to draw conclusions
about the overall politicization of science. However, the changes which occur within the
government category and the interest group category reflect changes in partisan bias. In
particular, I note witness disappearances after 1995, and witness appearances in the years
following 1995. A complete table of acronyms can be found in Appendix A and the
complete table of the government and interest group witnesses across all three issues can
be found in Appendix B.
The first trend which I discovered upon a closer analysis of the government and
interest group witness data pertained to the presence of Representatives and Senators on
particular hearings. Hearings for both NASA and Superfund demonstrated substantial
Congress-member testimony prior to 1995. After 1995, these witnesses disappeared;
Congress was not calling its own members to testify on either of these issues in the years
following the OTA. Conversely, in the case of global warming, the number of
Representatives and Senators offering testimony followed an inverse trend: no members
testified prior to 1995 and an increased number testified after 1995. Prior to 1995, three
republican and five democratic Congress members testified on NASA. There are four

democrats who testified on the issue of Superfund. In contrast, after 1995, three of the
four Congress members testifying on global warming were republicans. The democrat,
Joseph Lieberman @-CT), is staunchly opposed to global warming, and is an outspoken
advocate of taking action to prevent further climate change. He is, however, self-defined
as an independent democrat, and often aligns with the Republican Party on policy issues.
The data seem to indicate a decrease in the democratic leaning of government witnesses
for NASA and Superfund and a concurrent increase in republican influence on global
warming.
NASA authorization interest groups demonstrate an increased conservative
leaning. In particular, we note that the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the
National Space Society (NSS), and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) disappear from the witness lists, and the Aerospace States Association (ASA),
the United Space Alliance (USA), and the Cato Institute appear. The AIAA was
established in 1963, and commits itself to "To advance the arts, sciences, and technology
of aeronautics and astronautics, and to promote the professionalism of those engaged in
these pursuits."31 It seeks to achieve this purpose as follows:
AIAA encourages original research ... furthers dissemination of new
knowledge ... fosters the professional development of those engaged in
science and engineering ... improves public understanding of aerospace
and its contributions ... fosters education in engineering and science ...
promotes communication among engineers, scientists, and other
professional groups ... and stimulates outstanding professional
a~com~lishments.~~
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In contrast, the CAT0 Institute is a traditionally libertarian institution, self-defining its
purpose as, "The Cato Institute seeks to broaden the parameters of public policy debate to
allow consideration of the traditional American principles of limited government,
individual liberty, free markets and peace."33 The IEEE "a non-profit organization, is the
world's leading professional association for the advancement of technology."34
Conversely, the ASA is "a bi-partisan representative of the grass roots of American
Aerospace. It is a scientific and educational organization of Lieutenant Governors and
Governor-appointed delegates."3s Thus, even within the category of interest groups, we
see different trends in the types of interest groups that are called to testify on the issue of
NASA Authorization. The trend indicates favoritism towards grassroots and principled
organizations, as opposed to professional societies. The presence of Cato as a witness
reflects the increased conservatism of the GOP majority in Congress.
The Superfund data are hard to analyze in terms of the change in interest groups.
There are very few interest group witnesses present after the fall of the OTA, therefore
we can only make statements about which witnesses disappear in 1995. In particular, the
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council (HWTC) and Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) disappear. The HWTC is the primary representative for most large hazardous
~ NRDC is a liberally slanted environmental defense
waste management f r n ~ . 'The
organization, which is devoted to achieving the following:
"The Natural Resources Defense Council's purpose is to safeguard the
Earth: its people, its plants and animals and the natural systems on which
all life depends.. . We work to foster the fundamental right of all people to
have a voice in decisions that affect their environment. We seek to break
33
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down the pattern of disproportionate environmental burdens borne by
people of color and others who face social or economic inequities."37
Thus, in the case of Superfund, liberal interest groups do not reappear in hearings
after 1995, and, unlike NASA authorizations, are not replaced with another form of
interest group. The data set is so small, however, that it is difficult to draw determinant
conclusions about the politicization trends within the interest group category.
Global warming demonstrates a disappearance of the World Resources Institute

(WRI), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the American Nuclear
Energy Council (ANEC), and Gas Research Institute (GRI), and an increase in the
presence of the Charles River Associates (CRA), United Mine Workers Association
(UMWA), US Public Interest Research Group (USPIR), American Petroleum Institute
(API), Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI), and Council for Global Climate Change
(GCC). Chris Mooney highlights the API (2005, 82), CEI (95), and GCC (81) as partisan
organizations, who received substantial industry funding in support of their anti-global
warming campaigns. Their presence in hearings after 1995 supports Mooney's
hypothesis that the science presented in hearings on global warming was increasingly
politicized. In contrast, the WRI defines itself as "an environmental think tank that goes
beyond research to find practical ways to protect the earth and improve people's lives."38
The ANEC is a component part of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), which is ". .. the
policy organization of the nuclear energy and technologies industry and participates in
both the national and global policy-making process. NEI's objective is to ensure the
formation of policies that promote the beneficial uses of nuclear energy and technologies

''Last Accessed April 2,2007. h~://www.nrdc.ordaboutirnission.as~
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in the United States and around the world."39 The ASME was "Founded in 1880 as the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, today's ASME is a 120,000-member
professional organization focused on technical, educational and research issues of the
engineering and technology community."40
The data for global warming interest group and government witnesses
seem to support both Mooney's claims and the results of my statistical analysis.
Not only do we see an increase in the overall politicization, but we also see an
increase in the political leanings of the witnesses themselves, within the interest
group category and the government category.
Summary of Chapter I11
The data presented in this chapter demonstrate an increase in the overall
politicization of the issue of global warming, as well as a decrease in the politicization of
the issues of NASA authorization and Superfund. Concurrently, after 1995, the numbers
of "laboratory," "industry" and "other" witnesses decreased substantially.
The data also show that the loss of the OTA did not necessarily mean of loss of
objective sources of information. In the case of NASA, the OTA had a significant
presence, but was replaced with the NRC, NCGIA, and PIPS upon its demise in 1995.
The OTA also carried substantial weight on the issue of Superfund, and upon the
congressional takeover in 1995 the GAO appears to step up to take the place of the OTA.
The OTA did not have the same presence on the issue of global warming, but the data
reflect an overall decrease in the number of research witnesses after 1995. Not only did
the OTA disappear, but its contempor,ariesin the research category also disappeared.
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Finally, within the category of government witnesses we see a parallel to the
overall politicization trends within each case study. Both NASA and Superfund show a
decrease in the number of political representatives, while global warming shows an
increase in the number of representatives and senators who are present in congressional
hearings. In the interest group category, we see an overall increase in politicization,
across all three issues. The witnesses that Congress called after 1995 tended to be grassroots organizations, which were more conservatively-minded and principle-driven than
those called before 1995. This trend would support Mooney's claim that there has been
an overall increase in the politicization of science, following the 1995 GOP takeover of
Congress.

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS

This study began with a fundamental question involving the politicization of the
scientific information received by Congress. Through the lens of my three case studies, I
examined this question systematically in order to test my three hypotheses:
The politicization hypothesis: more witnesses that represent organizations with a
bias would testify to the House Committee on Science after the decline of the
OTA.
The substitution hypothesis: the objective information provided by OTA would
not be substituted for by some other government research organization, like OTA.
The party hypothesis: witnesses testifying after the OTA's demise would have a
Republican bias.

In keeping with the expectations of scholars who study the role of parties in
Congress, I remained open to the possibility that politicization may vary across issues. In
two of the three cases, the findings show no evidence of politicization in the sources of
information, and even some evidence of less politicization after OTA. In the third case,
the sources became increasingly politicized. From these results, we can deduce that the
degree of politicization depends on the issue being considered. Some issues, like global
warming, are more divisive along party lines than others. Thus, the first hypothesis is
only valid in one of the three cases.
The substitution effect also varies by issue. In the first case, the OTA sources of
information were replaced with information from the NRC, PIPS, and NCGIA; in the
second case, the OTA was partially replaced by the GAO; and in the third case, the OTA

,

did not play a central role prior to 1995, but upon its demise, all sources of "research

witness disappeared. One possibility is that the more specialized the policy issue is, the
less likely one is to see substitution effects.
Finally, within the interest groups category, we see an increase in the GOP bias of
the individual witness groups called to testify. Interestingly, in all three cases, the
interest group witnesses reflect an ideological shift favoring conservatives after the 1995
GOP takeover. If I were to delve into the acadimic and industry categories as well, I
would expect to see a similar trend: greater focus on grassroots, conservative principles,
and a deviation from professional, politically neutral organizations or groups. This
hypothesis seems to hold up across issues, and may reflect the general drift toward
partisanship on the Hill. The majority party rules the House and this bias is evident even
on the least partisan issue. One wonders if any other issues escape the partisan bias noted
in these data. Yet, it is worth noting that OTA's fall was not necessarily a cause of the
rise in GOP leaning witnesses; with or without the OTA, the GOP would have invited
their allies; just as the Democrats had before them,
In returning to my initial hypothesis, I can make three statements as a result of my
analysis.
First, the politicization of the congressional sources of information depends on the
nature of the hearing topic. In the case of NASA and Superfund the types of
witnesses present do not seem to reflect an increased politicization. However, the
case of global warming, which is politically charged, reflects an increase in
politicization. Further, there is a decrease in the overall number of witnesses
which are called, indicating that Congress is not only calling its own witnesses,
but is also turning a silent ear to witness testimony.
Second, the OTA had a range of influence on congressional hearings. In some
cases, it was heavily replied upon; in other cases, it was merely a contributing
source. As a result, its demise had differing effects on the politicization of
congressional information. It would be misleading to link the overall
politicization of scientific information to the demise of the OTA. My results are
inconclusive: two cases show a replacement source of information filling OTA's

.

role, and the third reflects a non-influential OTA prior to 1995 and the
disappearance of all research-based witnesses after 1995.
Third, while the politicization of scientific information cannot be conclusively
linked to the demise of the OTA, it is fair to say that the sources of scientific
information reflect a conservative leaning, following the 1995 GOP takeover.
The interest group witnesses in particular reflect an increased influence of the
Republican Party. Mooney appears to be correct in his analysis that there has
been a change in the types of scientific information on which congress relies.

In sum, the results are mixed: the degree of politicization largely depends on the issues at
hand.

Caveats
A few caveats are worth noting to put the main findings into perspective. First
and foremost, while the primary focus of my study is to look at the effects of the OTA
and the sources of information on which Congress relies, we cannot neglect to
acknowledge that the change or lack thereof that we find in sources of scientific
information might not be due to the demise of the OTA, but rather, due to a bias inherent
in the new Congress. This possibility is particularly relevant to the third hypothesis.
While the OTA was present, both the Republicans and the Democrats had a common
resource which would provide equally unbiased information to both, neither confirming
nor denying the partisan claims of either. Specifically, the OTA sought to remain above
making policy recommendations, thus keeping itself from falling into the trap of
partisanship. One would expect that upon its demise, it would be possible to link an
increase in political bias in the sources of scientific information to the absence of the
OTA. However, it is possible that the change in sources of information (or lack thereof)
could be caused by the change in congressional leadership, and might not be reflective of
the absence of the OTA. While this leadership change creates our "window of
opportunity" it could also be the direct cause of the changes that we see after 1995.

Second, in the original design of the study, I assumed I that organizational
affiliation correlated with the type of testimony that a witness would provide. I also
assumed that a research based witness would provide more scientifically accurate and
unbiased information than would an interest group or an industry witness. This
assumption is based on logical principles, and corroborated by both Mooney and Bimber.
However, the assumption is not expressly tested in this case study and thesis. Moreover,

I do not take into consideration the individual political affiliations of academic witnesses
or the particular testimonies of research witnesses. In so far as my study tests Bimber's
conclusions using the same research characteristics, it is accurate and generally
applicable. Further analysis should justify the assumptions which are made and clarify
all remaining witness affiliations.
Finally, since the study is focused on one committee, the patterns found here
should be subjected to further analysis before we generalize about the effect of OTA's
demise. Though I have no reason to doubt that the political intent of hearings in other
committees also varies by issue, future research should also take into account the
scientific witnesses presented before committees that do not have the express jurisdiction
over issues of scientific merit. Mooney would suggest that the primary politicization of
science occurs precisely in committees that do not have the jurisdiction or the authority to
consider issues of scientific merit. While the wide majority of science based hearings
appear before the Science Committee, politicization is not arbitrarily confined to one
particular committee. This assumption should also be tested, by expanding my research
scope beyond merely this particular committee. An expansion of this nature would lend
itself to conclusions which are more widely applicable to the entirety of congressional

committee hearings on science issues. Future steps for this analysis include consideration
of committees other than the House Committee on Science, as well as analysis of direct
witness testimony and a complete witness affiliation database.

Concluding Remarks
Jon M. Peha, Professor of Electrical Engineering and Public Policy at Camegie Mellon
University stated on July 25, 2006,
"This year, almost every committee in Congress will face one or more
issues that are similarly hard to disentangle without expertise in some area
of science or technology. This includes issues related to energy, the
environment, health care, food safety, national defense, homeland
security, space exploration, intellectual property, transportation, and
telecommunications, just to name a few (Peha, 2006, I)."
Peha (2006, 1) goes on to discuss the characteristics of an effective science advisory
organization, stating that it must be "responsive, credible, impartial, and independent."
Without a doubt, the OTA served as this source of information to Congress. In its
absence, Congress members must find a replacement for OTA or go without the
objective, balanced information provided by the OTA. Peha states,

"In short, there is a fundamental gap in the information available to
Congress. There is no consistent source of in-depth assessments that are
balanced, complete, impartial, and produced at a time and in a format that
is sensitive to the specific needs of Congress [9]. CRS reports are sensitive
to Congressional needs and are designed to be impartial, but, by design,
are limited in scope and depth. Partisan input also can be sensitive to the
needs of Congress, hut it is never impartial. Other information produced
outside of Congress tends to he far less sensitive to Congressional needs,
and the majority of it advocates for particular positions rather than merely
providing a baseline assessment (6)."
The results of my analysis of the second hypothesis demonstrate in the case of
NASA that Congress felt the need for such a research agency, replacing the OTA with
PIPS and the NCGIA. The hearings on Superfund appear partially to replace the OTA

with the GAO. In the case of global warming, the 1995 GOP takeover resulted in the
shortage of all research witnesses. Whether this gap was directly linked to the absence of
the OTA, or whether it was an indirect consequence of the administrative change, the
conclusion is still the same: Congress felt a significant absence of a particular type of
responsive, credible, impartial, and independent information. The results of the third
hypothesis c o n f m this conclusion: in the absence of the OTA, the issues which were
politically tenuous saw a striking lack of non-politicized testimony. Though we should
be glad that politicization is not rampant across all issues, politicization of science for any
issue is no less worrisome than if it extended across the broad range of issues.

APPENDIX A: Acronyms
AAAS: American Association for the Advancement of Science
AAES: American Association of Engineering Societies
ACEEE: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy
AF: Air Force
AFL-CIO: American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AGU: American Geological Union
AIAA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AISSO: AeroAsti-o and International Small Satellite Organization
AL: American Legion
ANEC: American Nuclear Energy Council
API: American Petroleum Institute
ASA: Aerospace States Association
ASEB: American Societies for Experimental Biology
ASGSB: American Society for Gravitational and Space Biology
ASI: Analytic Services Inc
ASME: American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ATSDR: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
AV: AeroVironment
BA: K W Brown and Assocs
BCSE: Business Council for Sustainable Energy
BT: Banker's Trust
CACNSP: Citizens' Advisory Council on National Space Policy
CAN: Concerned Neighbors in Action
CBO: Congressional Budget Office
CCHW: Citizen's Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes
CDC: Center for Disease Control
CE: Coalition for the Environment
CEI: Competitive Enterprise Institute
CEQ: Council on Environmental Quality
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
CRA: Charles River Associates
CRS: Congressional Research Service
CSRC: Contarmnated Sites Resident Committee
CURC: Coal Utilization Research Council
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DOC: Department of Commerce
DOD: Department of Defense
DOE: Department of Energy
DOS: Department of State
DOT: Department of Transportation
EDF: Environmental Defense Fund
EHPA: Environmental Health Protection Agent
EIA: Energy Information Adrmmstration
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency

EPRI: Electric Power Research Institute
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration
FAS: Federation of American Scientists
GAO: Government Accountability Office
GARP: Global Atmospheric Research Program
GCC: Council for Global Climate Change
GOP: Grand Old Party (Republican Party)
GRJ: Gas Research Institute
GS: Geological Survey
GZA. Goldberg-Zoino and Assocs
HA: Hirschhom and Associates
HRS: Hazardous Ranking System
HSRC: Northeast Hazardous Substance Research Center
HWTC: Hazardous Waste Treatment Council
IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
P A : Independent Petroleum Association
PCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IRG: International Resources Group, Ltd
ISCD: Internal Security and Commerce Division
IWS: Ill Water Survey
L5S: L5 Society
MPAG: Madison Public Affairs Group
NAS: National Academy of the Sciences
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASUCA: National Association of State Utllity Consumer Advocates
NCAR: National Center for Atmospheric Research
NCATH: National Campaign Against Toxic Hazards and Clean Water Action Project
NCGIA: National Center for Geographical Information and Analysis
NCP: National Contingency Plan
NEI: Nuclear Energy Institute
NHA: National Hydrogen Association
NHPA: New Hampshire People's Alliance
NIEHS: National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
NIH: National Institutes of Health
NMA: National Mining Association
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
NPL: National Priorities List
NRC: National Research Council
NRDC: National Resources Defense Council
NRDC: Natural Resources Defense Council
NSF: National Science Foundation
NSS: National Space Society
OAST: Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology
OBM: Office of Budget Management
OCST: Office of Commercial Space Transportation
OEETD: Office of Environmental Engineering and Technology Demonstration

OERR: Office of Emergency and Remedial Response
ORD: Office of Research and Development
OSRMQA: Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance
OSTP: Office of Science and Technology Policy
OTA: Office of Technology Assessment
PFUT: Project Finance, Utilities and Telecommunications Group
PIPS: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
PS: Planetary Society
R&D: Research and Development
RAGS: Rising Above the Gathering Storm
Reach: Reach for the Stars '89
RF: Resources for the Future
RMI: Rocky Mountain Institute
RRS: RUST Remedial Service
S&T: Science and Technology
SERI: Solar Energy Research Institute
SFF: Space Frontier Foundation
SIO: Scripps Institution of Oceanography
SLH: Shearson Lehman Hutton
SRS: Scientific Research Society
SSTC: Space Systems Technical Committee
TAB: Technology Assessment Board
UMWA: United Mine Workers Association
USA: United Space Alliance
USPIR: US Public Interest Research Group
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHRC: Woods Hole Research Center
WMO: World Meteorological Organization
WRI: World Resources Institute
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